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The concept of social interactions in economics allows economists to explore applications
that are as rich as the social fabric. It also introduces numerous de¯nitional, econometric and
measurement issues. The paper aims at introducing the classes of models that accommodate
estimation of social interactions and at examining the key areas where signi¯cant advances
have been made in the identi¯cation of social e®ects. It surveys linear and nonlinear models
and their applications, including results regarding partial identi¯cation. The paper also
examines conceptual and methodological links with the spatial econometrics and the social
networks literatures and applications.
Keywords: social interactions, neighborhood e®ects, peer e®ects, quantal response, statis-
tical mechanics, social interaction empirics, endogenous social e®ects, partial identi¯cation,
self selection, sorting, nonlinear models, social multipliers, social networks, spatial econo-
metrics, variance contrasts.
Journal of Economic Literature classification codes: C00, C31, C35, C45, C73,
C81, D01, R22, Z13\Most people are other people. Their thoughts are some one else's opinions, their lives a
mimicry, their passions a quotation." Oscar Wilde, de Profundis.
1 Introduction
Within economics, the study of social interactions has expanded the domain of inquiry to
incorporate many ideas that are traditionally associated with sociology. Social interaction
analysis also extends the methodological individualism of economics in new directions due to
its focus on the feedbacks between individual behaviors and aggregate outcomes. By social
interactions we refer to interdependencies among individuals in which the preferences, beliefs
and constraints faced by one socioeconomic actor are directly in°uenced by the characteristics
and choices of others. We emphasize the word \directly" since these interactions do not occur
because individuals are a®ected through the e®ects of the choices of others on prices, as occurs
in an Arrow-Debreu world. In fact, these e®ects typically have features that render them
forms of externalities. Canonical examples include conformity e®ects which mean that the
utility from a given behavior increases when others make the same choice and social network
e®ects in which information di®uses according to who is in contact with whom. Social
interactions have been used to help explain phenomena ranging from cigarette smoking to
the persistence of ghettos and inner city poverty.2
While social interactions models take sociological ideas seriously, they fully preserve the
purposive, choice-based formulation of individual decisionmaking. The theoretical work is
di®erent from \standard" economics only in that it expands the domain of factors that
determine individual decisions. It is thus no surprise that a precursor to the modern literature
2It is interesting to note that many of the ideas concerning persistent poverty in Wilson (2009) have been
formalized and studied in the social interactions literature.is Becker (1974). Further, it is also no surprise that social interactions models have close
parallels in game theory, e.g. global games [Morris and Shin (2003)] and especially quantal
response equilibria [McKelvey and Palfrey (1995)].
While still relatively new, the social interactions literature is already su±ciently large and
wide-ranging that a complete survey is beyond the scope of a single article.3 We therefore
focus on providing a framework that can function as a template for understanding the broader
literature. To do this, we outline a general theoretical framework for social interactions and
then describe the econometric implementation of variations of this framework, speci¯cally
focusing on identi¯cation issues. Various empirical papers are discussed as examples of
the particular models and econometric strategies. In addition, we describe some of the
implications of the social networks and spatial economics literatures for the study of social
interactions.
Section 2 outlines a basic model of social interactions. We focus on a discrete choice model
of social interactions which has direct econometric analogs and so is in principle estimable.
Section 3 describes the baseline econometric models that have been used in the study of social
interactions and focuses on what we call \classical" identi¯cation problems which involve the
disentanglement of endogenous and exogenous social e®ects. Some major empirical studies
using the baseline models are also described. Section 4 describes contemporary identi¯cation
problems, by which we refer to environments in which the error structures are a®ected by
self-selection and unobserved group variables. Empirical studies that address these problems,
including those that use experimental data, are reviewed. Section 5 discusses spatial and
network approaches to social interactions. Section 6 concludes.
3See Durlauf (2004) and Ioannides and Loury (2004) for related surveys in economics and Sampson,
Moreno®, Gannon-Rowley (2002) for a survey from the sociology perspective. Manski (2000) is a conceptual
overview.
22 A Discrete Choice Model of Social Interactions
A basic model of social interactions, one that captures many of the interesting implications
of integrating social factors into individual behavior, can be developed in the context of
decisions over a discrete set of choices. We generalize the multinomial choice model of Brock
and Durlauf (2002, 2007) to allow for social interactions structures, following Durlauf (1997)
and Ioannides (2006). We develop this framework for a population of I individuals each of
whom chooses between L di®erent alternatives; individual choices are denoted by !i: The
choice set is: S = f0;1;:::;L ¡ 1g: Each agent i is associated with a group g(i); which
is de¯ned as those members of the population whose behaviors and characteristics enter as
direct arguments in i's decision problem. The analysis of this section will assume that each
actor is a member of the same group, as our goal is describing how social interactions a®ect
individual and aggregate outcomes. Econometric analyses of the model typically presuppose
sampling of individuals across groups.
Each of the possible choices ` produces utility Vi;` for individual i: We conceptualize
choice-speci¯c utility as having three distinct components. The ¯rst is hi;`; which we think
of as private deterministic utility. It is private in that it does not exhibit direct dependence
on the choices of others and is deterministic as it is treated as known to the modeler;
in econometric work this is operationalized by assuming it is known modulo some set of
unknowns that are estimable. The second component is deterministic social utility and
captures dependence of the utility of a given choice on others' choices. If individual i chooses
` and j chooses s; then individual i receives Ji;j;`;s: This is quite general as each pair of
individuals and pair of choices is assigned a separate payo®; we will restrict the payo®s
in order to produce tractable results. We further assume that the payo®s to the choices of
others are additive. A ¯nal component is a random utility term, ²i;`: These are assumed to be
independent across choices and individuals; relaxation of this assumption is straightforward
and not additionally insightful. Together, these components are summed so that Vi;` =
EfVi;`g + ²i;`; with the expected utility taking the form:









j;sji denotes the probability i assigns to choice s on the part of j: For later use, we
de¯ne J as the array of interaction coe±cients, a I £ I £ L £ L array with element Ji;j;`;s;
and I as the I £ I identity matrix.
This expected utility function allows for an explicit characterization of the equilibrium
choice probabilities once the probability distributions for the random utility terms is speci-
¯ed. We assume that the ²i;`'s are distributed according to the multinomial logit model with
dispersion parameter &; so that individual i0s choice probabilities are given by:























´i;` 2 S;i = 1;:::;I: (2)
Higher & implies lower variance. The case of & = 0 implies purely random choice, where all
outcomes are equally likely because the private random utility density is so di®used that the
maximum of the random utility shocks will control the choice. In contrast & = 1 means
that choices are deterministic in the sense that the private random utility terms are all equal
to 0 with probability 1:
Self-consistency of beliefs for this model requires that





















´i; ` 2 S i = 1;:::;I: (3)
It is straightforward to verify that under the Brouwer ¯xed point theorem, at least one such
¯xed point exists for each of individual i's choice probabilities.
It is common in the social interactions literature to simplify the interaction structure by
restricting social utility so that individuals only care about the fraction of the population
making the same choice he does. This renders the agent indi®erent as to who makes the
choices and means that if others do not coincide with the choice, what they choose instead
is irrelevant. Under this simpli¯cation, the object of interest is not the matrix with elements
pi;`; the individual choice probabilities, but rather the aggregate choice probabilities, p` =
I¡1 P
i pi;`: This leads to:
p
e





exp[& (hi;` + Ji;`p`)]
PL¡1
s=0 exp[& (hi;s + Ji;sps)]
; ` 2 S; (4)
4where Ji;` is the social utility weight i assigns to the share among the population of others
making the choice `:
A leading case in the theoretical literature focuses on binary choices with the decision
space f1;¡1g: These models typically treat social utility as a function of the expected average
choice of others, i.e., where me
i;j = pe
j;1ji ¡pe
j;¡1ji: Under the assumption of self-consistency of
beliefs, mj = me
i;j: Let m denote the I¡vector with the mj's as elements. In this case, it is
convenient to use the hyperbolic tangent function, tanh(x) ´
exp(x)¡exp(¡x)
exp(x)+exp(¡x); ¡1 < x < 1;
and have:
mi = tanh[&hi + &Jim]; i = 1;:::;I; (5)
where hi = hi;1 ¡ hi;¡1; and Ji denotes the ith row of the array, now a matrix, of inter-
action coe±cients Jij:4 Brouwer's ¯xed point theorem guarantees that the system of social
interactions with an interactions matrix J admits an equilibrium that satis¯es (5) [Ioannides
(2006)].
To understand the properties of the binary choice model, we consider the case where
all heterogeneity across agents is due to random utility, i.e. we assume that hi;`; and Ji;`;
are constant across agents. This implies Eif!jg = m; for all individuals, so that the Nash
equilibria associated with (5) simplify to
m = tanh(&h + &Jm): (6)
The properties of this special case are straightforward to describe. If &J > 1; and h = 0;
then the function tanh(&h + &Jm) is centered at m = 0; and equation (6) has three roots: a
positive one (\upper"), (m¤




¡j: If h 6= 0 and J > 0; then there exists a threshold H¤; which depends on &
and J; such that if &h < H¤; equation (6) has a unique root, which agrees with h in sign.
4It is easy to see this as a speci¯cation of J in (1) above. That is, by going back to the original notation







5In other words, given a private utility di®erence h; if the dispersion of the random utility
component is su±ciently large, the random component dominates choice. If, on the other
hand, &h > H¤; then equation (6) has three roots: one with the same sign as h; and the
others of the opposite sign. That is, given a private utility di®erence, if the dispersion of
the random utility component is small, then the social component dominates choice and is
capable of producing multiplicity in conformist behavior. If J < 0; then there is a unique
equilibrium that agrees with h in sign.
The relationship between the number of equilibria and the parameters J;h; and & can be
given some intuition. Holding & constant, it is not surprising that multiple equilibria emerge
when the strength of conformity e®ects, measured by J; is large relative to the strength of
private incentives, measured by h: What is less obvious is the role of &: The parameter &
measures the degree of heterogeneity in payo®s across individuals in the population. Higher
& means greater heterogeneity. The degree of heterogeneity, in turn, determines how private
and social incentives interact to produce equilibria. When & is small, which means that &J is
small, then relatively large fractions of the population will experience draws such that either
²i;` ¡ ²i;`0 or ²i;`0 ¡ ²i;` is large. This means in turn that a relatively high fraction will have
their decisions \controlled" by their idiosyncratic payo®s in the sense that the realization of
the idiosyncratic part of the payo®s is large enough that it dominates the common private
and social incentives. By symmetry of the density for ²i;` ¡ ²i;`0; equal percentages of the
population, in expectation, will make choices 1 and ¡1 because their payo®s are dominated
by the idiosyncratic terms. But this means that a relatively small percentage of the popu-
lation remains that can engage in self-consistent bunching because of social utility e®ects.
Put di®erently, when enough agents make choices driven by symmetrically distributed payo®
di®erences, this implicitly delimits the magnitude of the social utility terms since it delimits
the m term in Jm:
The existence of a mapping between parameters characterizing the strength of social
in°uences, deterministic private incentives, and heterogeneity in random private incentives
is not unique to the binary choice model. For example, Brock and Durlauf (2002, 2007) show
that for the multinomial choice model, when hi;` = h; 8i;`; then if &J
L > 1; then at least three
6equilibria exist, whereas if &J
L < 1; the equilibrium aggregate choice probabilities are unique.
The dependence of the threshold for multiplicity on the number of choices L occurs because
when the ²i;`'s are independent across i; the probability that the idiosyncratic draw for one of
the possible choices will dominate the agent's decision is increasing in the number of choices.
To give another example, we consider local interaction models such as Blume (1993), which
conceptualize agents as located on an integer lattice. Applying this assumption to our model
amounts to replacing our social utility formulation with J
P
jj¡ij=1 Ef!jg so that agent utility
is only a®ected by the choices of so-called nearest neighbors. It is straightforward to see that
the mean choice level is characterized by equation (6). These examples illustrate a general
principle about discrete choice models of social interactions, namely that their qualitative
properties are often independent of the speci¯cs of the interaction structure. This property,
called universality in the physics literature, helps justify the analysis of particular interactions
structures, since their properties are not tied to their detailed speci¯cation.
The property of universality provides a segue between social interactions models and
statistical mechanics models in physics (which is the context in which the property was
originally conceptualized.) Statistical mechanics models study the macroscopic properties
of large number of interaction objects (e.g. atoms). Interestingly, the Brock-Durlauf model
with hi;j = h; and Ji;j = J corresponds to the mean ¯eld approximation of the Curie-Weiss
model of ferromagnetism. The Curie-Weiss model is designed to explain the magnetization
of iron, in which magnetization is created when the majority of atoms are spinning in one
direction (atoms spin either up or down.) Curie and Weiss hypothesized that ferromagnets
occurred in nature because the probability of a given atom's spin depends on the overall
spin of the system. The mean ¯eld approximation refers to the use of the expected rather
than realized average spin; this is done because the model is too complicated for analytical
work otherwise. We explain this analogy because we believe the mathematics of statistical
mechanics systems has yet to be fully exploited by social scientists. That said, interesting
examples do exist, including Topa (2001), who employs so-called contact processes to study
local interactions in unemployment.
Despite universality, it is of course still essential to be careful in translating statistical
7mechanics models into social science contexts. One basic reason is that statistical mechan-
ics models take as primitives the conditional probabilities that relate objects in a system,
whereas socioeconomic contexts require that these conditional probabilities derive from prim-
itives with respect to preferences, constraints, and information sets. One important demon-
stration of the importance of making this distinction is due to Horst and Scheinkman (2006)
who show that in a social interactions model in which the individual payo® structure has
one set of nonzero versus zero values for Ji;j;`;s, the equilibrium conditional probabilities that
relate the choices will have a di®erent distribution of zero and nonzero values when agents
know the choices of others when making their own. Therefore, the conditional probability
structure for a given statistical mechanics model does not immediately reveal the payo® in-
terdependencies needed to generate it. Another basic reason is that exact versus approximate
statistical mechanics models can have substantively di®erent interpretations in social science
contexts even though the approximation has not intrinsic interest in a physical context and is
useful to simplify calculations and provide analytical tractability. Brock and Durlauf (2001a)
show that the exact solution to the Curie-Weiss model without approximation corresponds
to a social planner's problem whereas the mean ¯eld approximation represents an exact (to
social scientists) noncooperative model of binary choice.
Our treatment of social interactions models does not address the microfoundations of the
interactions. Our canonical social interactions model treats Ji;j;`;s as a primitive. One can
identify models which produce di®erent types of social interactions as equilibrium outcomes,
e.g. Bernheim (1994) for a general theory of conformity in choices, Streufert (2000) on the
mapping from group educational characteristics on individual educational choices induced
by the use of local information to infer the payo®s to education, and Akerlof and Kranton
(2002) on the interaction of personal identity and behavior. This type of work, however, has
not been directly integrated into the abstract theoretical structures we have outlined.
83 Econometric Models of Social Interactions: Classical
Identi¯cation Issues
In this section we consider the problem of identifying social interactions when individual
unobservables are i.i.d. within and across groups. This leads to variations of the classical
identi¯cation problem of simultaneous equations systems that re°ect the speci¯c structure of
social interactions models. These statistical models are designed both to allow for the esti-
mation of a role for some type of social in°uence on behavior as well as for the determination
of what types of social in°uences are empirically relevant.5
The distinction between types of social interactions did not arise in our baseline theo-
retical model of social interactions because e®ects other than those associated with the Jij's
are subsumed in the private deterministic utility term, since we were considering individ-
uals within a common group. Manski (1993) is the ¯rst to emphasize the importance of
distinguishing types of social interactions when one moves from analysis of equilibria within
one group to analysis of data drawn across groups, and develops an important dichotomy.
One type of interactions he refers to as endogenous e®ects, which capture the case where
social interactions occur between one agent's own decisions and those of others; an essen-
tial feature of this type of interaction is that the choices are simultaneously determined.
A canonical example is peer e®ects in classroom e®ort; one student works hard based on
whether others do so (or are expected to do so) because the e®ort of others either renders his
e®ort more productive or less psychologically costly. Of course, one can equally well imagine
that individuals are a®ected by the personal characteristics of others. The educational level
of parents of classmates matters if these parents, for example, help form the aspirations of
the student (which for us means a®ects their net utility from e®ort). Manski calls these
contextual e®ects.
In discussing the econometrics of social interactions, we will ¯rst consider the case where
the unobserved heterogeneity is independent across agents and unpredictable given individual
5For reasons of space we ignore issues of estimation of social interactions models, e.g. Aradillas-Lopez
(2007), de Paula (2009), Krauth (2006), and Conley and Topa (2007).
9and group characteristics. We will relax these assumptions in the next section.
Our analysis of identi¯cation focuses on the two main classes of econometric models that
have been employed. We start with the linear in means models, which represents the linear
regression version of social interactions models. Next, we study identi¯cation problems as
apply to discrete choice models of social interactions. It will be evident that the connections
between the ¯rst class of models and any underlying economic theory are at best tenuous;
Brock and Durlauf (2001b) show that one can reverse engineer a linear in means model to
represent an agent's optimal behavior, but this type of analysis is tautological. Discrete
choice models of course, provide a tighter link between theory and econometrics, but even
here the empirical literature has typically eschewed the explorations of these links. In our
view, the social interactions literature would bene¯t from a more structural approach to
econometric analysis.
3.1 Linear Models of Social Interactions
The most common econometric model of social interaction describes outcomes a linear func-
tions of individual and group level determinants. The data are conceptualized as observa-
tions of individuals across groups. Letting g(i) denote i's group, let xi denote individual level
characteristics, zg denote group level characteristics, mg(i) the expected average choice in the
group and ²i as unobserved individual heterogeneity. The linear in means model expresses
outcome yi as:
yi = ®0 + ®xi + µzg(i) + ¯mg(i) + ²i: (7)
Applying an expectations operator to both sides of (7) provides an expression for mg(i) in











zg(i) + ²i: (8)
Some of the literature often does not di®erentiate between contextual and endogenous e®ects,
in the sense that xg(i); the average value of xi in g(i); and mg(i) are not distinguished; any
variable that is common to all agents within g(i) is treated as a source of social interactions.
10Regressions of the form (7) and especially (8) have been used in many contexts to study
social interactions. Datcher (1982) deserves credit for pioneering the empirical approach
along the lines of equation (8). Durlauf (2004) provides an overview of the many studies
that have estimated regressions of this type and surveys the sorts of variables that have
been purported to represent evidence of social interactions. Prominent examples include
Brooks-Gunn, Duncan, Klebanov and Sealand (1993), who relate IQ and behavioral prob-
lems at 36 months, high school dropout rates, and non-marital fertility, Aizer and Currie
(2004) and Bertrand, Luttmer, Mullainathan (2000) who argue that individual use of social
services/public assistance is a®ected by the usage rates of others with whom one interacts,
Weinberg, Reagan and Yankow (2004) and Bayer, Ross and Topa (2008) who argue that
individual market outcomes are in°uenced contemporaneously by the labor market status
of neighbors (see also Ioannides and Loury (2004) for a review of the literature), Corco-
ran, Gordon, Laren, and Solon (1992) who argue that individual labor market outcomes
are in°uenced by growing up in a poor neighborhood, Burke, Fournier and Prasad (2003)
who argue that physicians' following each others' practices produces geographical variations
in medical care practices, Young and Burke (2001) who establish that competitive forces
versus social interactions in the form of custom in crop-sharing contracts lead to patterns
in contract terms that are spatially uniform separated by boundaries where the terms shift
abruptly, and Gaviria and Raphael (2001) who explore endogenous peer e®ects in drinking
and smoking among teens. An especially interesting example of this type of regression is
Mas and Moretti (2009) who employ a data set which measures supermarket employee pro-
ductivity in 10 minute intervals; the data set is also impressive because the set of peers for
a given worker rapidly shifts due to di®erences in shift composition and because the spatial
orientation of workers in a store is known. This allows for analyses of such questions as
whether frequent interactions induces stronger social e®ects and whether physical proximity
to others matters.
One topic that has received particular attention concerns the e®ects of school and class-
room peers. Examples of studies on this subject include Hoxby (2000) who examines peer
e®ects in the classroom, Hanushek, Kain, Markman, and Rivkin (2003) who ¯nd that growth
11in academic achievement is associated with average achievement of school peers, Hoxby and
Weingarth (2006) who ¯nd that once the e®ects of peers' achievement are properly accounted
for, peers' race, ethnicity, income, and parental education have no or very weak e®ects, Henry
and Rickman (2007) who study peer academic achievement and learning for preschoolers,
and Lavy, Paserman and Schlosser (2008) who ¯nd that the proportion of low achieving
peers has a negative e®ect on the performance of regular students.
To be clear, there have also appeared numerous studies that have failed to ¯nd evidence
of social interactions. Among recent studies, Oreopoulos (2003) fails to ¯nd evidence that
di®erences in neighborhood quality a®ect longer run labor market outcomes, which contrasts
with ¯ndings such as Corcoran, Gordon, Laren, and Solon. Guryan, Kroft, and Notowidigdo
(2007), employing methods similar to Moretti and Mas, ¯nd little evidence of workplace
e®ects in the context of golf tournaments. We do not attempt to adjudicate the disparate
results in the extant literature, which may be due to factors ranging from di®erent data sets
to di®erent model speci¯cations, but rather wish to emphasize that, taken on face value, the
empirical evidence for social interactions is not decisive.
The regression literature on social interactions su®ers from serious measurement prob-
lems. One di±culty with empirical studies based on (8) (and for that matter, nonlinear
analogs of this equation) is that the relevant economic theory does not dictate the appropri-
ate empirical measures of contextual variables that a researcher ought to use. As a result,
one ¯nds Bertrand, Luttmer, and Mullainathan (2000) using the product of welfare usage
and own-ethnic group intensity to explain individual welfare usage whereas Aizer and Currie
(2004) use the utilization rate of an individual's language group to measure social e®ects on
public prenatal care utilization. Related to the absence of guidance on qualitative measures
of social interactions, the empirical literature does not typically consider how social variables
should interact with individual decisions. If the reason why utilization of social services de-
pends on the usage of others is due to information transmission, as argued by Bertrand et
al., then it is unclear why the percentage of users is the appropriate variable, as opposed
to some nonlinear transformation, since presumably one only needs one neighbor to provide
the information.
12Cooley (2009) analyzes this measurement problem from a di®erent vantage point, namely
the discrepancy between observable measures and causal ones. She argues that from the
vantage point of theory causal sources of peer e®ects between students in a classroom in-
volve the unobservable endogenous e®ort and the unobservable contextual ability whereas
work on classroom peer e®ects typically uses classroom achievement as the measure of out-
comes and various ad hoc measures of student characteristics for contextual e®orts. Cooley
demonstrates that absence of attention to the link between unobserved causal factors and
observable proxies can render regression coe±cients uninterpretable. Cooley's arguments ul-
timately highlight the importance of rich observable measures for the identi¯cation of social
interactions if one is to uncover behavioral mechanisms; this is one reason why the results
in Mas and Moretti (2009) are especially compelling.
A distinct measurement problem arises because theory does not provide guidance as to
the appropriate measure of groups. Hence one ¯nds the use of zipcodes to determine neigh-
borhoods in Corcoran et al. and census tracts and blocks in Weinberg, Reagan and Yankow
(2004). Akerlof (1997) argues that social interactions are best understood as occurring in a
social space which may have many dimensions; this follows naturally when one considers the
overlapping e®ects of physical proximity, ethnicity, gender, education and the like on ways
in which individuals interact. Conley and Topa (2002) are unusual in seeking to identify
the appropriate axes for social space, arguing that ethnicity is of particular importance in
de¯ning social interactions.
Statistical models of social interactions in sociology typically are di®erent from the spec-
i¯cation of equations (7) and (8). One reason is that the role of endogenous e®ects, mi; is
typically ignored. A second reason is that sociologists typically prefer hierarchical models in
which contextual e®ects mediate individual e®ects, i.e.
yi = ®0;i + ®1;ixi + ²i; (9)
where
®0;i = °0 + °zg(i) + ´0;i; (10)
®1;i = ¸0 + ¸zg(i) + ´1;i: (11)
13The terms ´0;i and ´1;i are random variables that allow for unpredictable parameter het-
erogeneity. Modulo the complications these terms introduce into the error structure, the
hierarchical model in essence adds additional regressors to (7) which consist of the products
of elements of xi and zg(i): These models are thoroughly discussed in Bryk and Raudenbush
(2001); see Raudenbush and Sampson (1999) for an elaborate treatment of these models for
social interactions contexts.
As is true for most of econometric literature on social interactions, much of the attention
devoted to the linear in means model has involved the study of identi¯cation. In fact, the
linear in means model exhibits a variant of the classical identi¯cation problem of simultaneous
equations; this was ¯rst recognized by in a seminal paper by Manski (1993) and dubbed the
re°ection problem. To understand the problem, assume that the within group averages of
the individual characteristics map one to one to the contextual e®ects, xg(i) = zg(i); where







xg(i) + ²i: (12)
In this case, there are 2r + 1 coe±cients corresponding to 2r + 2 structural parameters.
Identi¯cation thus fails. In contrast, a necessary condition for identi¯cation is that there
exists at least one individual characteristic whose group level average is not a contextual
e®ect, shown originally in Brock and Durlauf (2001b); this corresponds to the classical row
condition for instrumental variables estimation. Durlauf and Tanaka (2008) give the su±-
cient conditions for identi¯cation, which corresponds to the rank condition in simultaneous
equations estimation. These conditions, of course, require prior knowledge on the part of
the researcher and as such fall prey to the problem that social interactions models are typ-
ically open-ended,6 which means that the presence of particular group level determinants
of behavior are logically independent of the presence or absence of various individual level
determinants.
Once one moves away from a linear cross-section structure, the re°ection problem may
not hold even if there is a one to one correspondence between individual and contextual
6Brock and Durlauf (2001b) introduce the idea of model openendedness in the context of economic growth
models, but the idea is implicit in earlier critiques of econometric practice such as Sims (1980).
14e®ects. For example, nonlinear in means variants do not exhibit it. Brock and Durlauf
(2001b) show that the re°ection problem does not apply to





6= 0; relative to the space of twice di®erentiable functions, outside of nongeneric
cases. The intuition is straightforward; the re°ection problem requires linear dependence
between group outcomes and certain group level aggregates, which is ruled out by the non-
linearity in (13). Similarly, shown in Blume and Durlauf (2005), when one introduces en-
dogenous e®ects into a hierarchical model nonlinearities that are produced because of cross
product terms between m and xi also break the re°ection problem.7 Further, the re°ection
problem does not arise in linear models with dynamic forms of interactions, e.g.
yit = ®0 + ®xi;t + µzg(i);t + ¯mg(i);t¡1 + ²i;t: (14)
However, the logic of the re°ection problem, which derives from co-movement of contextual
and endogenous e®ects, carries over when one considers the precision of parameter estimates.
As such, it is a fundamental problem in empirical work. Further, the examples we have given
where the problem does not arise rely on parametric modeling assumptions. Manski (1993),
for cross section data, in fact provides a nonidenti¯cation result for nonparametric contexts
that parallels the re°ection problem in linear models.
The fact that endogenous social interactions help amplify di®erences in the average group
behavior across groups can itself serve as basis for identi¯cation. Glaeser et al. (2003) use
patterns in the data to estimate a social multiplier. For a change in a particular fundamental
determinant of an outcome, this is de¯ned as the ratio of a total e®ect, which includes a
7Drewianka (2003) draws attention to the fact that nonlinearities that are inherent in a particular phe-
nomenon may further aid identi¯cation. In his study of social e®ects in marriage markets, Drewianka argues
that a higher marriage rate in a community may induce the propensity of unmarried people to marry (an
endogenous social e®ect), cet. par. But by also leaving fewer people unmatched it hampers search and
reduces marriage prospects of others and thus causes additional variation. He ¯nds that an increase in
the share of the population that is unmarried reduces the marriage rate of never-married men by the same
amount and that of never-married women by less.
15direct e®ect to an individual outcome plus the sum total of the indirect e®ects through the
feedback from the e®ects on others in the social group, to the direct e®ect.
Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman suggest measuring the social multiplier by comparing
the coe±cient vector produced by a within-group regression across individuals,
yig = · + ¼xi + ´ig; (15)
with the coe±cient produced by a regression across group level averages,
¹ yg(i) = ·
0 + ¼
0¹ xg(i) + ¹ ´g(i): (16)
Social multipliers are de¯ned as the ratios of the coe±cients in ¼0 to their respective ones in
¼:8 This approach, of course, requires the existence of at least one contextual e®ect, xi: The
social multiplier approach has also proven useful in uncovering ¯; even when no individual
or contextual e®ects are present. We will return to this approach in the next section.
The social multiplier approach is particularly useful in delivering a range of estimates for
the endogenous social e®ect when individual data are hard to obtain, as in the case of crime
data. Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman (1996) motivate their study of crime and social
interactions by the extraordinary variation in the incidence of crime across US metropolitan
areas over and above di®erences in fundamentals. If social interactions in criminal behavior
are present, variations in observed outcomes are larger than what would be expected from
variations in underlying fundamentals, precisely because of the social multiplier. 9
8For example, suppose that the true data generating process is yig = ®0 +®xi +
P
j6=i yij +´ig; where ®
is scalar. Then, one can show that ¼
0
¼ = 1
(1¡¯)(1+¾¯); which Glaeser et al. refer to as the social multiplier,
where ¾ = Var(¹ xg)
Var(xi):
9While the literature on the social multiplier has so far rested on linear models in static settings and
emphasizes measuring the strength of social interactions, the concept may be extended fruitfully to dynamic
and nonlinear settings, to complete versus incomplete information, and to more complex interaction topolo-
gies [Brock and Durlauf (2001a); Bisin et al. (2006); Ioannides (2006)]. The nature of social multipliers and
their use to measure social interactions will di®er in these contexts. Bisin et al. (2006) show that incomplete
information has the e®ect of dampening the aggregate e®ects of the agents' preferences for conformity and
thus reducing the social multiplier relative to the complete information. And of course, the equilibrium
aggregate e®ects of a marginal change in private incentives will generally no longer be constant in nonlinear
contexts.
163.2 Discrete Choice Models of Social Interactions
Discrete choice models of social interactions have been applied in a wide range of contexts,
although the model is used more frequently than its linear in mean analog. Early examples
include Crane (1991) Evans, Oates and Schwab (1992) on teenage behaviors; more recent
examples range from cigarette smoking [Krauth (2005), Nakajima (2007)] to medical prac-
tices [Burke et al. (2003)]. As in the case of linear models, one ¯nds con°icting results in the
literature. For example, Crane, focusing on residential neighborhoods, ¯nds strong social
e®ects whereas Evans Oates and Schwab do not, focusing on schools, does not; similarly,
Nakajima concludes that peer e®ects play a larger role in smoking than does Krauth.
The econometrics of discrete choice models with social interactions is studied in Brock
and Durlauf (2001a,b; 2006, 2007). These papers show that the re°ection problem does not,
with relatively weak assumptions, hold in multinomial choice models when the analyst knows
the distribution of the unobserved error terms; the standard assumption in theoretical models
that the errors are logit is inessential. Intuitively, identi¯cation holds so long as the individual
and contextual e®ects exhibit su±cient variation so as to imply that choice probabilities are
nonlinearly related to them. Further, Brock and Durlauf show that for the binary choice
case identi¯cation holds even if the error distribution is unknown, following Manski (1988).
A number of interesting variations of our baseline discrete choice model have been studied.
Soetevent and Kooreman (2007) use Brock and Durlauf (2001a) as a building block for their
empirical discrete-choice social interactions model with a ¯nite number of agents, which is
roughly along the lines of equation (5) above, but adapted to a probit model (shocks are
normally distributed). They characterize its equilibrium properties | in particular, the
correspondence between interaction strength, number of agents, and the set of equilibria.
There is an interesting conceptual di®erence between this model and the binary Brock and
Durlauf formulation [Brock and Durlauf (2001a)]. In the latter, equilibrium in a group of
interacting agents is derived by imposing a rational expectations condition on the subjective
choice probabilities of the agents and by assuming that the number of agents is su±ciently
large that each agent ignores the e®ect of his own choice on the average choice level. In
17contrast, Soetevent and Kooreman's model involves interactions in relatively small groups
of given sizes in which choices of other individuals are assumed to be fully observed and
therefore an individual's pay-o® depends on the actual choice of others in her group |
interactions are eponymous. In such a classic non-cooperative game setting, Soetevent and
Kooreman focus on its one-shot pure Nash equilibria with binary outcomes, !i = 1;¡1; and
estimate the model in e®ect as a system of simultaneous equations by means of simulation
methods.10 That is, the likelihood of a choice pattern
» != (!1;:::;!I) is the product of the
individual likelihoods for all individuals:










!j;if !i = ¡1: (17)
Their empirical application examines individual behavior of high school teenagers in
almost 500 school classes from 70 di®erent schools using data from National School Youth
Survey (NSYS) of the Netherlands. In their baseline model endogenous social interaction
e®ects are strong for behavior closely related to school (truancy), somewhat weaker for
behavior partly related to school (smoking, cell phone ownership, and moped ownership)
and absent for behavior far away from school (asking parents permission for purchases).
Intra-gender interactions are generally much stronger than cross-gender interactions. When
school-speci¯c ¯xed e®ects are allowed, social interaction e®ects are insigni¯cant, with the
exception of intra-gender interactions for truancy. The fact that they do ¯nd signi¯cant social
interaction e®ects for a type of behavior closely related to school-based interactions (truancy),
and do not ¯nd such e®ects for behaviors that might not be school-based, suggests that their
model measures genuine endogenous social interaction e®ects rather than unobserved social
group e®ects. This work is also signi¯cant because its simulation-based estimation method
allows the authors to account for the potential multiplicity of non-cooperative Nash equilibria
and the identi¯cation problems it poses.
Another interesting variation of our baseline discrete choice model is developed in Aradillas-
Lopez (2008, 2009) and considers the question of identi¯cation of social e®ects when agents'
10With many agents, the two formulations are equivalent, but the ¯nite-agent case raises issues of identi-
¯cation which are common in models of systems of simultaneous outcomes. See Tamer (2003).
18expectations are not necessarily correct. Aradillas-Lopez (2008) focuses on the empirical
implications when beliefs are only required to be consistent with the iterated elimination
of dominant strategies. Probability bounds are established for social interactions parame-
ters which depend on the number of iterations. Aradillas-Lopez (2009) extends this type of
reasoning to consider environments in which agents' behavior is required to obey a criterion
known as weakly consistent equilibrium, which amounts to requiring that the choices of other
agents always lies in the support over which an agent forms beliefs about these behaviors.
These approaches provide a link between the social interactions literature and developments
in behavioral economics.
In terms of empirical work, our baseline discrete choice model has been extended to con-
sider dynamic contexts and in turn been applied to duration and optimal stopping problems.
Sirakaya (2006) uses a national US sample to identify the risk factors for recidivism among
female, male, black, white and Hispanic felony probationers. She assumes that the individ-
ual hazard function, the probability that a probationer will recidivate depends on individual
and neighborhood characteristics as well as social interactions among probationers, that is:
the hazard function for probationer i is assumed to depend on individual i's characteristics,
xi; characteristics of i's neighborhood, zg(i); and i's expectation of the proportion of proba-
tioners who recidivate by some duration in i's neighborhood, mg(i)(t); and the mean time to







®0 + ®xi + µzg(i) + ¯mmg(i)(t) + ¯timerg(i)
i
; (18)
where ²0(t) denotes the baseline hazard function. Since, a probationer is required to live
in the jurisdiction that passed the probation sentence, the neighborhood of probationer i;
g(i); is assumed to be the jurisdiction. That is, probationers do not endogenously sort into
neighborhoods. Sirakaya's results point to social interactions as one of the most signi¯cant
factors a®ecting recidivism within all gender, ethnicity and race groups with unobserved
neighborhood-level heterogeneity being negligible. Other signi¯cant factors are being male,
being young, unemployed, having a drug abuse history and prior felony convictions, and
living in neighborhoods with high serious violent crime per capita for Blacks.
A number of other studies are closely related to Sirakaya's methodological framework.
19Irwin and Bockstael (2002) argue that the development of adjacent parcels of land in exurbia
may confer bene¯ts, if proximity is desired, but also costs, if congestion and environmental
degradation arise. They estimate net social interaction e®ects in exurban land use develop-
ment that are negative. A second is Costa and Kahn (2007), who use a longitudinal data set
of Union Army soldiers and a cross-sectional data set of the population of Andersonville to
examine the role of social networks in ensuring survival of Union Army soldiers in captivity.
They use the panel data to estimate hazard functions for individual survival probabilities as
functions of the number of friends, individual characteristics, and camp conditions, and the
cross-sectional data to estimate a probit model of the probability of survival as a function
of the number of friends and of demographic characteristics. They ¯nd that friends had a
statistically signi¯cant positive e®ect on survival probabilities (which theoretical considera-
tions make it ambiguous) and that the closer the ties between friends as measured by such
identi¯ers as ethnicity, kinship, and the same hometown the bigger the impact of friends on
survival probabilities. De Paula (2009) uses the same data and ¯nds evidence of bunching in
desertions that is consistent with social interactions. His analysis is based on a sophisticated
optimal stopping problem with endogenous social interactions whose econometric properties
are carefully examined.
4 Identi¯cation: Contemporary Perspectives
In our discussion of social interactions, we made what is conventionally regarded as the
\best case" assumption on the error structure, namely that individual unobservables are
exchangeable across individuals and groups. In other words, there is no basis on which to
di®erentiate the errors according to the observable information on the individuals and the
associated groups of which they are members. Much of modern econometric practice has,
of course, developed in a systematic e®ort to avoid such assumptions [cf. Heckman (2001)].
In this section, we explore the implications of two deviations from these assumptions: self-
selection into groups and the presence of group level unobservables.
204.1 Identi¯cation of Social Interactions with Self Selection to Groups
and Sorting
For many contexts, most notably residential neighborhoods, it is natural to assume that
economic agents choose their group memberships and that these choices are in°uenced by
social interaction e®ects. Endogenous group formation of this type naturally a®ects the
distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity within groups which depends on both endoge-
nous and contextual e®ects, as well as individual speci¯c characteristics., i.e. in equation
(7), Ef²ijxi;zg(i);mg(i);i 2 g(i)g 6= 0: This means that data taken from environments with
endogenous group choice su®er from the standard self-selection problem. Since self-selection
into a group means that each member of the group has been in°uenced by a common set
of social factors, this leads to dependence in the conditional expectations across individuals;
Manski (1993) refers to this as correlated e®ects. It is easy to see that the failure to account
for correlated e®ects can produce spurious evidence of social interactions.
The social interactions literature has followed the broader econometric literature in devel-
oping strategies to address self-selection. A number of studies have employed instrumental
variables methods; see Evans, Oates and Schwab (1992). Instrumental variables approaches
can be problematic. The basic problem is that empirical social interactions models tend
to be open-ended [Brock and Durlauf (2001b)], in the sense that the underlying behavioral
model for the phenomenon under question does not naturally generate valid instruments,
i.e. there is typically no reason outside of \intuition" why an instrument may be used. This
contrasts with the case in the estimation of Euler equations, in which a theory of interest is
used to produce a forecast error, which naturally generates instruments via the information
set that was used to construct the implied forecasts.
A second, in our view, more promising strategy, follows the control function approach
pioneered in Heckman (1979). From this vantage point, self-selection is addressed in a way
that respects the fact that it constitutes an additional behavior on the part of individuals.
Following Heckman, suppose that evaluation of the attractiveness of a group g may be
expressed in terms of an unobservable \latent" quality variable Q¤
i;g(i): That is, individual i
21evaluates group g by means of observable attributes Wi;g(i) which enter with weights ³; and
unobservable component #i;g(i) :
Q
¤
i;g(i) = ³Wi;g(i) + #i;g(i): (19)
Random shocks ²i and #i;g(i) are assumed to have zero means, conditional on (are orthogonal
to) regressors (xi;zg(i);Wi;g(i)); across the population. If individual i were to choose the
group which a®ords her the highest possible evaluation, then the respective shocks no longer
have zero means. For various classes of parametric and semiparametric assumptions on
the joint distribution of (²i;#i;g(i)); conditional on choosing group g(i); an expression for
Ef²ijxi;zg(i);i 2 g(i)g may be obtained as proportional to a function ±(³;Wi;g(i);Wi;¡g(i)); so
that (7) may be rewritten as:
yi = ®0 + ®xi + µzg(i) + ¯mg(i) + ·±(^ ³;Wi;g(i);Wi;¡g(i)) + »i: (20)
Note that the selection correction term depends on the attributes of all groups in the oppor-
tunity set, not only the one that is chosen. This model is estimable.11
Equation (20) integrates information about the group selection process into the behav-
ioral equation for outcomes and in fact does so in a way that provides additional information
on social interactions. The additional regressor ±(^ ³;Wi;g(i);Wi;¡g(i)); a®ects the structure
of the linear in means model relative to the re°ection problem. To see why, consider two
possibilities. First, suppose that groups are chosen according to the individuals' character-
istics xi and the group's characteristics zg(i): If so, then the additional regressor will take
the form ±(^ ³;xi;zg(i);z¡g(i)): As such it constitutes an individual speci¯c random variable
whose group level average does not appear in the equation. Second, suppose that groups are
chosen according to expected average behavior in the group. In this case ± will functionally
depend on mg(i); i.e. ±(^ ³;mg(i);m¡g(i)); where m¡g(i) refers to groups other than g(i): Since ±
is almost always a nonlinear function, its introduction transforms the linear in means model
to a nonlinear one. Both of these changes are su±cient to produce identi¯cation even if the
model were not identi¯ed under random assignment. The ability of self-selection to facilitate
11Brock and Durlauf (2001b; 2006) provide more details on the econometric properties of the estimation
process.
22identi¯cation is, at one level, not a surprise. Since group choice is a behavior, it naturally
contains information about the determinants of the choice. What is perhaps more surprising
is that this is a case where randomization works to the detriment of identi¯cation.
Ioannides and Zabel (2008) exploit the ¯rst of the above possibilities in an application
of housing demand with neighborhood e®ects. Individuals choose neighborhoods and the
quantity of housing. By working with the neighborhood clusters subsample of the National
American Housing Survey (NAHS) and the con¯dential version of the NAHS, Ioannides and
Zabel identify the neighborhood in which each dwelling unit is located and thus link with rich
contextual information. Their results for the neighborhood choice model suggest, roughly
speaking, that individuals prefer to live near others like themselves. Their estimation of
the demand equation for housing structure allows for contextual e®ects, de¯ned in terms of
demographic characteristics in the census tract of residence, and for endogenous social e®ects,
de¯ned as the mean housing demand among neighbors. Their estimation results con¯rm that
the endogenous neighborhood e®ect is signi¯cant and stronger (at 0.8504 instead of 0.7254)
when endogeneity of neighborhood choice is accounted for. Endogenous e®ects are smaller
when cluster-speci¯c random e®ects are included.
A third route to addressing self-selection in estimating social interactions follows from
consideration of prices for group membership. It is natural to expect that self-selection into
residential neighborhoods will be re°ected in housing prices, making them prices of admission
into neighborhoods. Such prices may be thought of as hedonic prices and are often estimated
as arbitrary functions of neighborhood amenities. Not surprisingly in view of Brock and
Durlauf's results on the role of self-selection, Nesheim (2002) shows that preferences and the
technology of social interactions, measured as children's schooling as a function of the mean
parental education in the neighborhood and of parental characteristics,12 may be identi¯ed,
12This is often posited and the associated sorting bias emphasized. See Brooks{Gunn et al. (1993),
Kremer (1997), who estimates schooling as a function of parental schooling and neighborhood schooling
and assesses the implied role of sorting in inequality, and Ioannides (2003), who shows by means of non-
parametric estimation techniques with the same data as those used by Kremer that non-linearities in the
general relationship, whose special case is estimated by Kremer, may alter his key results. Educational
outcomes for children are sigmoid functions of parental schooling and neighborhood schooling, allowing for
23in principle, provided that the endogeneity of the hedonic price is acknowledged. This allows
one to control for dependence between equilibrium marginal price and neighborhood quality.
It is facilitated by an explicit solution for the hedonic price in terms of the mean parental
education in the neighborhood [Nesheim (2002); Ioannides (2008)].13
A fourth strategy for integrating group choice with social interactions has involved estima-
tion of equilibrium models of neighborhood formation in which social interactions play a role
in locational decisions. Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan (2007) employ a discrete choice model
to estimate preferences over neighborhood composition with respect to housing choices. Cal-
abrese, Epple, Romer and Sieg (2006) estimate a sophisticated structural model which explic-
itly addresses the political economy of local educational expenditure in which neighborhood
composition is shown to a®ect neighborhood choice.
4.2 Group-level Unobservables
The second basic problem facing econometric analyses of social interactions is the presence
of unobserved group e®ects. In considering a classroom, for example, it is evident that
di®erences in teacher quality will simultaneously a®ect all students in a classroom. Manski
(1993) refers to this as the problem of correlated unobservables. From the perspective of our
basic social interactions models in sections 3.1 and 3.2, these may be understood as replacing
the initial error assumptions with ®g(i)+²i; where ®g(i) is a common group-speci¯c shock. Of
course, one can imagine more elaborate changes in the error structure so that, for example,
group e®ects have di®erential impact across agents, but this has not been the focus of the
econometric literature.
In our view, unobserved group e®ects represent the most di±cult hurdle to the construc-
tion of compelling evidence of social interactions. The reason for this is that, unlike the
case of self-selection, there is typically no economic reasoning that can be brought to bear to
multiple equilibria.
13Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan (2007) report some nonstructural hedonic regressions of housing prices
on neighborhood characteristics. See also Bayer and Ross (2009) who propose using neighborhood prices to
construct a control function to proxy for unobserved neighborhood characteristics.
24model unobserved group in°uences. Hence there is no natural solution to group e®ects that
is analogous to the joint modeling of group formation and behaviors within groups. The
methods that exist for overcoming their presence are thus essentially statistical.
One approach, unsurprisingly, involves the use of panels to di®erence out the group e®ects.
This approach is put to good use in Hoxby (2000). Intuitively, variation in zg(i) over time
induces variation in mg(i) overtime and so produces identi¯cation in the di®erenced model.
For Hoxby's model, zg(i); is the percentage of a student's own ethnic group in a classroom.
Brock and Durlauf (2007) show that this argument can be readily applied in panels with
discrete data, using ideas due to Chamberlain (1984). This justi¯es the approach taken in
Arcidiacono and Nicholson (2005) in evaluating the e®ects of peers on specialty choice in
medical school. This approach, of course, requires that the assumption that ®g(i) is itself
not time varying. Further, this treats the individual ¯xed e®ects as a nuisance parameter.
Arcidiacono, Foster, Goodpaster, and Kinsler (2007) consider a linear model in which the
spillover e®ects operate through the ¯xed e®ects of a student's peers making ¯xed e®ects
for one agent in°uence others. They provide conditions under which these e®ects can, in a
panel, be exploited to facilitate identi¯cation of social interactions.
This class of strategies for dealing with group level unobservables can be problematic
when errors do not enter the model additively. Cooley (2008) shows how social interactions
may be identi¯ed for a class of models with nonadditive group e®ects, exploiting results
in Imbens and Newey (2009). This allows for interesting di®erences in social interaction
e®ects across quantiles of observable characteristics. Cooley applies the strategy to school
data in North Carolina, ¯nding strong evidence of intra-ethnic group social interactions
in achievement. Cooley's approach does require the use of instrumental variables, which
of course constitutes a second general strategy for dealing with unobserved group e®ects,
albeit one that can be hard to justify because of theory openendedness. Given the fact
that unobserved group e®ects are often undertheorized, openendeness is especially hard to
overcome in ¯nding plausibly valid instruments. On the other hand, as the careful discussion
in Cooley shows, it is not impossible given a speci¯c context.
254.2.1 Variance Based Approaches
An alternative strategy for uncovering social interactions in the presence of unobserved group
e®ects is based on the variance covariance structure of outcomes. One approach is due to
Graham (2008) and extends the variance comparisons of the type initially suggested by
Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (2003). To understand the method, we follow Graham
and make two substantive modi¯cations of the linear-in-means model. First, any observable
individual and contextual controls are ruled out. Second, behaviors depend on the realized
rather than expected choice of others, that is on ¹ yg(i) rather than on mg(i): This leads to the
model
yi;g(i) = k + ¯¹ yg(i) + ²i;g(i) = k + ¯mg(i) + ¯[¹ yg(i) ¡ mg(i)] + ²i;g(i): (21)
It is easy to see that the regression approach cannot uncover the presence of endogenous
social interactions if averages of the individual-level determinants are used to instrument
for mg(i): However, Graham shows that identi¯cation can still be achieved if one places
some structure on (21). In doing this, he employs an approach that echoes the classical
literature on identi¯cation in simultaneous equations models, in which the structure of the
variance covariance matrix of the reduced-form system augments identi¯cation via exclusion
restrictions. The key to this approach is assuming that the unobserved group e®ects are
random rather than ¯xed e®ects, which imposes structure on the variance covariance of
outcomes. The random e®ects assumption can be unappealing in contexts where groups are
endogenously formed, but is more appealing in Graham's case since teachers are randomly
assigned to classrooms.
To see how a random e®ects assumption facilitates identi¯cation, suppose that the resid-
uals in (21) can be decomposed as
²i;g = #g + ´i;g; (22)
where #g is a group level unobservable and ´i;g is an individual level unobservable; each has
mean 0 and constant variance across i and g; further the two variables are uncorrelated with
each other. These assumptions imply that for a group of size n; the variance covariance
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This last expression indicates how the parameters ¯;¾2
#;¾2
´ can be recovered from size-speci¯c
group variances. Graham (2008) and Durlauf and Tanaka (2008) discuss ways to modify
Graham's baseline assumptions and preserve identi¯cation. For example, the latter paper
shows that identi¯cation is preserved when independence of within classrooms is replaced
by exchangeability. An especially valuable study is Davezies et al. (2006) which provides a
systematic discussion of the use of the variance covariance matrix of residuals for the linear
in means model to facilitate identi¯cation; they also provide results for binary choice models.
A nice feature of their work is the clari¯cation of when homoskedasticity assumptions are
needed.
Graham's approach decomposes the unconditional between-group variance of outcomes
into the variance of group-level heterogeneity (here, due to teacher quality), the between-
group variance of any individual-level heterogeneity (here due to variance of average student
ability across classrooms), and a third term that re°ects the strength of any social interac-
tions. Graham uses data from Project STAR, a class-size reduction experiment in Tennessee.
In that experiment, kindergarten students and teachers were randomly assigned to large and
small classrooms. Whereas in large classrooms, performance of talented students is typically
o®set by that of below average students, resulting in little variation in mean student ability,
in small classrooms groups being composed of mostly above or below average students are
more frequently observed, thus generating greater variation in mean ability. As a result, the
variance of peer quality is greater across the set of small classrooms than it is across the
set of large classrooms, while random assignment of teachers ensures that the distribution
of their characteristics is similar across the two types of classrooms. Graham (2008) reports
di®erences in peer group quality which constitute evidence of social interactions.
274.2.2 Variance Components and Social Interactions
The use of variance information has been exploited in a di®erent way by Solon, Page and
Duncan (2000). The analysis focuses on the case where one cannot observe either family-
speci¯c or group-speci¯c e®ects. Solon, Page and Duncan propose a variance decomposition
of individual outcomes to bound the contribution of group e®ects. One can formulate their
analysis in terms of a variance components decomposition [Searle, Casella and McCullough
(2006)]:
yi;f;n = ¹f + ºn + of;n + ²i;f;n; (23)
where ¹f denotes a family e®ect, ºn denotes a group e®ect, of;n denotes an interactive
e®ect between family and group and ²i;f;n denotes an idiosyncratic e®ect. Assuming that
these components are orthogonal (and such a decomposition of yi;f;n always exists), one can
calculate the variance contribution of of;n+²i;f;n to the overall variance of yi;f;n: Solon, Page
and Duncan do not use this decomposition directly, instead they use sibling versus neighbor
covariances to bound the variance of ºn; ¯nding little evidence that neighborhoods a®ect
education.
One limitation of this approach is that it reduces the vector of social interactions de¯ned
by zg into a scalar corresponding to
¯®+µ
1¡¯ zg; as such one cannot tell whether the lack of
aggregate in°uence of neighborhoods is due to social in°uences of others nor can one tell
whether the individual components are canceling each other out. Another limitation is that
the presence of of;n can make interpretations problematic, although Solon, Page and Dun-
can argue that one can assume the term is positive due sorting across neighborhoods. For
these reasons, Oreopoulos (2003) is a particularly interesting application of the correlation
method. This paper uses data from Toronto that allow one to trace the adult labor market
outcomes of children who grew up in di®erent public housing projects; these projects di®er
in terms of neighborhood characteristics such as crime. The restriction to public housing
project di®erences simpli¯es the interpretation of variance decompositions in terms of social
interactions since one can more easily conceptualize reasons for public housing neighbor-
hoods to di®er than neighborhoods in general. Further, since assignment was random across
public housing projects, this eliminates correlations between individual and neighborhood
28characteristics. That said, Oreopoulos also ¯nds that social interactions fail to play a large
role in explaining di®erences in adult economic outcomes.
4.2.3 Partial Identi¯cation with Nonlinear Models
A ¯nal approach to unobserved group e®ects is due to Brock and Durlauf (2007), who
develop partial identi¯cation results for binary choice models under what they argue are
weak assumptions about the distribution of the unobserved group e®ect. The basic idea of
this work is to exploit an essential di®erence between endogenous e®ects and unobserved
group e®ects: only endogenous e®ects can produce multiple equilibria. Hence, if evidence of
multiple equilibria can be generated, it represents evidence of social interactions.
Brock and Durlauf operationalize this in several ways. First, they consider the use of
\pattern reversals" in group level outcomes. A pattern reversal occurs when the rank order
of average outcomes between two groups is the reverse of what one would predict given the
observed individual and contextual e®ects for the groups. Brock and Durlauf then demon-
strate that under various shape restrictions on the probability density of the unobservables,
pattern reversals can only occur because of social interactions. For example, if the distri-
bution of unobservables shifts monotonically in observables, then pattern reversals cannot
occur without social interactions. A second approach involves the bimodality of linear combi-
nations of contextual e®ects. Here Brock and Durlauf show that, conditioning on a common
average outcome, the cross section distribution of certain linear combinations of contextual
variables must be unimodal. This last result corrects a misconception that multiple equilibria
induce multimodality of average outcomes conditional on contextual e®ects; while multiple
equilibria do induce a mixture density of outcomes, not all mixtures are multimodal.
Brock and Durlauf (2009) extends this idea to the study of social e®ects in technology
adoption. In this analysis, individuals are motivated to adopt a new technology by both
individual observable and unobservable characteristics (which may be correlated across in-
dividuals) as well as by the percentage of the population that has adopted, which de¯nes
the social interactions e®ect. They provide conditions under which a higher adoption rate
29by individuals whose observable fundamentals predict a lower adoption rate than another
group can only occur because of social e®ects. This pattern reversal does not occur due
to multiple equilibria but rather due to the potential for social e®ects to lead agents with
di®erent private incentives to bunch and adopt simultaneously. As such the analysis comple-
ments the more structural one of de Paula (2009) as well as a subtle investigation by Young
(2008) on the observational di®erences between learning and conformity models in dynamic
environments.
While partial identi¯cation arguments of the Brock-Durlauf type have not been used
empirically, one does ¯nd analyses that may be interpreted in this way. For example, Card,
Mas, Rothstein (2008) evaluate Schelling's classic tipping model of segregation by a search
for discontinuities in the relationship between changes in neighborhood racial composition
and initial racial composition. We conjecture that this achieves partial identi¯cation of the
e®ect of neighborhood composition on individual utility so long as one imposes a continuity
assumption on the density of unobservables, which is what Brock and Durlauf (2009) call a
shape assumption.
For many forms of social interactions, endogenous group formation can produce assor-
tative matching. One intuition follows from the Becker (1973) marriage model and can be
generalized in a number of ways [Durlauf and Seshadri (2003)]: social interactions can rep-
resent complementarities and mean that strati¯cation is e±cient. One example for this is
human capital complementarity across workers. In other contexts, such as neighborhoods,
social interactions can produce incentives to stratify regardless of whether the strati¯cation
is e±cient; Becker and Murphy (2000) give a nice exposition of this property for residential
neighborhoods. These theoretical results suggest that another strategy for uncovering social
interactions could involve the evaluation of degrees of strati¯cation across groups. While
there does exist a literature on the identi¯cation of complementarities via strati¯cation pat-
terns, see Eeckhout and Kircher (2009), Fox (2009), and Siow (2009) for recent studies, this
method has yet to be used to uncover social interactions per se. The closest example of this
strategy is Card, Mas and Rothstein (2008) discussed above as it uses changes in the degree
of segregation as the basis for inferences. It should be noted that methods for estimating
30neighborhood choices as exempli¯ed in Epple and Sieg (1999) are explicitly designed to ex-
plain the intragroup distributions of characteristics, so our suggestion should be understood
as complementary to this structural style of work.
While we have focused on partial identi¯cation in social interactions contexts, it is im-
portant to note that there is a broader literature on partial identi¯cation in games, much of
which is driven by multiple equilibrium issues; Tamer (2003) is a seminal contribution and
Berry and Tamer (2006) and Pakes (2008), are valuable overviews of this approach in the
context of industrial organization. Most recently, work has been done to address the con-
struction of sharp bounds in such games, see Beresteanau, Molchanov, and Molinari (2008),
and Galichon and Henry (2008).14
4.3 Experiments
As is true for much of economics, concerns over the assumptions needed to achieve identi-
¯cation with observational data have led to substantial interest in experiments and quasi-
experiments as ways to uncover social interactions. Experimental approaches have been
applied to a wide range of scales and contexts. The experimental approach has seen little
direct work on econometric issues, relying on the existing treatment e®ect methods to study
social interactions. One exception is Hirano and Hahn (2009) who study design issues for
social interactions experiments. Another is Graham, Imbens and Ridder (2008) who formu-
late measures of changes in group composition on group outcomes that generalizes standard
treatment e®ect calculations to explicitly consider social interactions.
At one end of the scale, interest in the e®ects of residential neighborhoods led the Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development in 1994 to implement the Moving to Opportunity
(MTO) demonstration in Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles and New York.15 The
14We thank Andres Aradillas-Lopez for suggesting the importance of this literature to social interactions
analysis.
15MTO was at least partially motivated by a previous intervention known as the Gautreaux program,
which involved moving some public housing families in Chicago to other parts of the city and other families
to nearby suburbs. As a means of evaluating social interactions, the Gautreaux data su®er from the absence
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residents of high-poverty public housing projects. Within this subsidized group, families
in turn were randomly allocated between two subgroups: one which received unrestricted
vouchers; and another which received vouchers that could only be used in census tracts with
poverty rates below 10% (these users are termed the experimental group). Members of the
experimental group also received relocation counseling.
The data from the MTO program have been used by a number of researchers to evaluate
social interactions; Kling, Liebman and Katz (2007) is the state of the art study both in terms
of methodology and coverage across all study sites; earlier analyses include Ludwig, Duncan
and Hirschfeld (2001) and Kling, Ludwig and Katz (2005). Following Kling, Liebman and
Katz, social interactions are inferred when evidence is found that movement to low poverty
neighborhood a®ects socioeconomic outcomes. In doing this, the authors calculate both
intent to treat and treatment on the treated e®ects, corresponding to the e®ects of receipt
of the voucher and use of the voucher respectively.
Overall, Kling, Liebman and Katz (2007) ¯nd at best mixed evidence on the e®ects of
movement to lower poverty communities, even though the housing voucher lottery caused
otherwise similar groups of families to reside in very di®erent neighborhoods. For adults,
their analysis revealed little evidence that movement to low poverty neighborhoods a®ected
economic self-su±ciency although some improvements occurred in mental health. In terms
of the children, they ¯nd that bene¯cial e®ects for teenage girls with respect to education,
risky behavior and physical health. On the other hand, for teenage boys, relocation to lower
poverty neighborhoods was associated with deterioration of a number of socioeconomic out-
comes, in particular with respect to criminal behavior. The evidence that e®ects of housing
vouchers appear to accrue from changes in neighborhood characteristics rather than from
moves per se suggests that interventions which substantially improve distressed neighbor-
hoods could have e®ects as least as large as those observed from moving to lower-poverty
of information about families that moved to suburbs and then returned as well as from substantial screening
of eligible families. For example, eligibility required a track record of good treatment of public housing units.
Rosenbaum (1995) is a good overview of Gautreaux ¯ndings.
32neighborhoods.
While the MTO program is a unique evidence source, there are a number of limitations
to the use of existing ¯ndings of program e®ects to either draw policy implications or even to
infer the empirical salience of social interactions. One general problem is that only one quar-
ter of eligible families signed up for MTO, which also suggests that decisions are in°uenced
by unobservables. These statistics also suggest that the respective populations are not rep-
resentative. In terms of policy, one criticism is due to Sobel (2006) who argues that di®erent
respondents' outcomes are correlated, which is known as interference among respondents.
Using the MTO demonstration as a concrete context, Sobel provides a causal framework for
policy evaluation when interference is present. He characterizes the properties of the usual
estimators of treatment e®ects, which are unbiased and/or consistent in randomized studies
without interference. When interference is present, the di®erence between a treatment group
mean and a control group mean does not estimate an average treatment e®ect, but rather
the di®erence between two e®ects de¯ned on two distinct sub-populations. This result means
that a researcher who fails to recognize it could infer that a treatment is bene¯cial when in
fact it is not. Kling et al. (2007) reject the argument of interference by pointing to the fact
that 55% of household heads who signed up for MTO had no friends, and 65% no family in
their baseline neighborhoods. However, to the extent that interference did not occur, then
it is unclear how to extrapolate the program to larger policy interventions. In particular,
Durlauf (2004) argues that moving large numbers of poor families to more a²uent com-
munities will induce general equilibrium e®ects in terms of the location decisions of other
families, the ability of schools in these neighborhoods to provide needed services, etc. One
can additionally imagine that the commitment of a²uent families to public schools would
be strained by a massive in°ux of poor families into their communities.
In terms of the question of the empirical salience of social interactions, MTO studies
su®er from the lack of attention to mapping between treatment parameters and the under-
lying social interactions. A range of neighborhood characteristics generate social interaction
e®ects; the role model e®ects of a²uent neighbors are quite distinct from the support mecha-
nisms that are generated by proximity to friends and relatives. MTO families who moved to
33low poverty neighborhoods did not simply move from worse to better neighborhoods, rather
they traded o® one vector of neighborhood attributes for another. This also renders the
interpretation of positive evidence of voucher e®ects problematic. One example is discussed
by Kling, Liebman and Katz: the reduction in asthma among children who move to low
poverty neighborhoods. One reason this may occur is due to stress reduction; to the extent
this is generated by neighborhood characteristics this is reasonably a social interaction ef-
fect. Another reason for lower asthma rates, however, could be reduced exposure to vermin
infestations, which in turn could be a consequence of changes in housing quality induced by
the requirement that the vouchers were used in low poverty neighborhoods. This is not a
social interactions e®ect.
Another study in this class is due to Angrist and Lang (2004) and focuses on Boston's
Metropolitan Council for Educational Opportunities (METCO). This is a voluntary desegre-
gation program that involves enrolling underprivileged inner city children in suburban public
schools. Angrist and Lang (2004) show that the receiving school districts, which have higher
mean academic performance than the sending ones, do experience a mean decrease due to
the program. However, they also show that the e®ects are merely compositional in that
there is little evidence of statistically signi¯cant e®ects of METCO students on their non-
METCO classmates. Their analysis with micro data from one receiving district (Brookline,
Massachusetts) generally con¯rms this ¯nding, but also produces some evidence of negative
e®ects on minority students in the receiving district. Since METCO is a voluntary program
for both sides and thus involves self-selection both at the individual and at the receiving
end, at best it can be thought of as uncovering treatment on the treated, which does not
translate naturally into claims about social interactions per se for reasons analogous to the
limitations of the MTO studies.
A second class of experimental studies have been conducted in laboratories, such as Falk
and Ichino (2006). Their experiment involves workers who are assigned in pairs to stu®
envelopes, with control being provided by subjects working alone in a room. These authors
¯nd that standard deviations of output are signi¯cantly smaller within pairs than between
pairs and average output per person is greater when subjects work in pairs. They also predict
34theoretically that peer e®ects are asymmetric: low productivity workers are more sensitive to
the behavior of high productivity workers as peers. They cannot con¯rm this claim directly
but do so indirectly.16 While the ¯ndings of the e®ects of working in pairs versus singly are
quite clean, they do not reveal why the e®ects are occurring and cannot even di®erentiate
between endogenous and contextual e®ects.
Another interesting study is Falk, Fischbacker, and GÄ achter (2009) who test endoge-
nous social interactions in a laboratory experiment where each subject simultaneously is a
member of two randomly assigned and economically identical groups with only \neighbors"
being di®erent.17 In each group the subjects decides how much to contribute to a public
good. Social interactions are said to be present if a subject's contribution in a given group
depend on the contribution by the subject's respective neighbors' at the same time. Most
of the subjects' contributions proved to be strongly in°uenced by the contributions of their
respective neighbors. Still, about 10% of the subjects were not in°uenced by the behavior
of their neighbors. And, once again, it is not clear what these e®ects say about behavioral
primitives.
A third class of studies involve natural experiments, in which assignment of individuals to
groups has occurred in a way that facilitates identi¯cation of social e®ects. Sacerdote (2001)
exploits the e®ects of randomly assigned freshman year room and dormmates at Dartmouth
College. Sacerdote estimates equation (7) with an individual's grade point average as a
dependent variable, as a function of an individual's own academic ability prior to college
16That is so, because with the data at their disposal for each subject they observe the output level only
in the treatment he or she is assigned to but not the output level in the counterfactual treatment. However,
the comparison of the quantiles of the distributions for the single and the pair treatment provide evidence
that is consistent with the claim [ ibid., p. 53, columns 1 and 2, Table 1]. At low productivity levels, peer
e®ects determine large di®erences in output between the pair treatment and the single treatment, while at
high productivity levels the di®erences are small.
17The ideal data set would observe the same individual at the same time in di®erent groups or neighbor-
hoods. Obviously, it is very di±cult for something like this to occur naturally. By contrast, it is possible to
come very close to such a \counterfactual state" in the lab, where decisions are observed by the same subject
at the same time in two otherwise economically identical environments, except for the fact that a person is
systematically and di®erentially a®ected by the behavior of his neighbors in the two environments.
35entrance, of his/her social habits, and of the academic ability and grade point average of
roommates, ¯nding that peers have an impact on each others' grade point average and on
decisions to join social groups such as fraternities. He does not, however, ¯nd residential
peer e®ects in other major decisions by college students, such as choice of college major.
Interestingly, peer e®ects are smaller the more directly a decision is related to labor market
activities. This illustrates an important limitation to many experimental studies, namely
whether results in one context extrapolate to others in which the consequences of choices
are larger.
Laschever (2008) exploits the random assignment of young American men to the military
during World War I to de¯ne exogenously constructed peer groups. He then measures the
impact of a group's unemployment rate from the 1930 Census on a veteran's own likelihood
of being employed. The magnitude of the e®ect is quite large: a one percentage point
increase in his peers' unemployment rate is associated with a half percentage point decrease
in one's own expected employment. He further decomposes this e®ect into endogenous and
contextual components and ¯nds that the endogenous e®ect is at least four times as large
as the contextual one. This lends some support to the hypothesis that the estimated social
e®ect is due to referrals or informal job contacts.
A ¯nal class of studies follows the spirit of natural experiments but does not rely on iden-
tifying contexts where random assignment holds, but rather on other data features. Young
and Burke (2001) uses di®erences in the terms of tenant/landowner agriculture contracts
across Illinois to evaluate the importance of social norms on contract terms. They ¯nd
that contract terms tend to focus on simple crop sharing rules that cannot be explained
by standard contract theory. Frey et al. (2009) use an extraordinarily detailed data set on
passengers from the 1912 sinking of the Titanic and argue that there exist evidence that
social norms mattered in determining survival. While studies of this type cannot illuminate
the sources of social forces, as they in essence identify similarities in intra-group behavior
that do not appear to be plausibly explained by individual characteristics, they are an im-
portant source of evidence in favor of the general view that social interactions are meaningful
determinants of behavior.
36While we have emphasized some of the limitations of experimental studies, we should be
clear that this does not imply either that the studies are uninformative or that their utility
is lower than observational studies of social interactions. Rather, we seek to combat the
presumption that experimental studies trump observational ones and that randomization
should be regarded as the gold standard for empirical work. Each has a key role.
5 Social Interactions in Social Networks
Our discussion of empirical work so far has focused on social interactions models in which
group in°uences are generated by relatively crude aggregates, normally the average charac-
teristics or behaviors of others. In contrast, social network models provide a primary focus
on the microstructure of interactions emphasizing heterogeneity in these interactions across
individual pairs. Goyal (2007) and Jackson (2008) provide broad overviews of the new the-
ories. Our objective here is to focus on the ways that social interactions analysis has been
enriched by network thinking.
5.1 Models
Methodologically, social networks matter in social interactions contexts because they fa-
cilitate identi¯cation by breaking the re°ection problem. This was originally recognized in
Cohen-Cole (2006) and is systematically explored in Bramoull¶ e, Djebbari, and Fortin (2009).
These authors modify equation (7) so that in a linear-in-means model each individual has
her own speci¯c reference group within a social network with an arbitrary adjacency matrix
J and the endogenous social e®ect is in terms of actual instead of expected actions of others.
Using Y to represent the I¡column vector with individual actions as its entries, we may
generalize the linear in means model (7) to allow for an arbitrary set of pairwise interactions.
In a linear setting, this could be accomplished by using an arbitrary I £ I matrix J: The
literature has speci¯ed interactions more narrowly by de¯ning Jik = 1; if i is in°uenced by k;
and Jik = 0; otherwise. In graph theory, this is known as an adjacency matrix. In addition,
37the endogenous e®ect is de¯ned as ¯JY: In other words, each pairwise interaction has a
endogenous interaction weight ¯ or a weight zero and every contextual e®ect has a µ or zero,
depending on whether or not the agents are directly linked. Given these assumptions, the
vector counterpart of (7) is:
Y = ®0¶ + ®X + µJX + ¯JY + ": (24)
This system of equations retains a single parameter ¯ for the endogenous social e®ect but
allows for more complicated interactions among individuals.
If j¯j < 1 then the properties of the adjacency matrix J ensure that I¡¯J is invertible.18
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Bramoull¶ e et al., Proposition 1 states that identi¯cation of social e®ects in equation (24)
requires both ®µ + ¯ 6= 0; and matrices I;J;J2 be linearly independent. Moreover, in
Appendix B they prove, when no individual is isolated, that the matrices I;J;J2 are linearly
dependent if and only if E fJYjXg is perfectly collinear with regressors (¶;X;JX): Otherwise,
the network structure is rich enough to make the variables (¶;X;JX;J2X;J3X;:::;) serve
as appropriate instruments that allow endogenous and exogenous e®ects to be identi¯ed.
Of course, identi¯cation may fail for some particular structures, but generally it is network
interactions that ensure identi¯cation.
Why does this condition allow for identi¯cation? Intuitively, accounting for network
structure means that each individual i's behavior is associated with a set EfYg(i)g = JEfYg
18If J; a non-negative matrix, is indecomposable, then Debreu and Herstein (1953), Theorem III., p. 601,
ensures that I ¡ ¯J is invertible, provided that ¯ times the maximal eigenvalue of J is less than 1. This
also holds under less stringent conditions. I.e., J is typically row-normalized and thus may be treated as a
stochastic matrix for which I ¡ ¯J is invertible for less stringent conditions than indecomposability of J:
38of variables that need to be instrumented. Consider two other agents, j and k such that
Jij = 0; (i and j are not socially connected) is imposed a priori. When Jik = 0 has not been
imposed a priori, one can use the individual characteristics for j to instrument for EfYg(k)g
so long as j does directly a®ect k: In other words, network structure, by setting certain
coe±cients equal to 0, produces exclusion restrictions that are analogous to the rank and
order condition in simultaneous equations analysis.
There exists a close relationship between social interactions and spatial econometrics
models that only recently was recognized by researchers. Consider the canonical version of
the linear social interactions model, in vector form, as in (24) above. This coincides with
the classic Cli®-Ord model of spatial autocorrelation (SAR) with one spatial lag, JY; but
no spatial error structure [see Cli® and Ord (1981)]. Spatial autocorrelation of the error
structure may be introduced and dealt with for estimation purposes. Since matrix J is row
normalized, then the matrix [I ¡ ¯J] is invertible, and the above system may be rewritten
in reduced form. Harry Kelejian and Ivar Prucha, and Lung-fei Lee have helped advance
the frontier on asymptotic properties of spatial econometric models. Kelejian and Prucha
(2008) o®er a modern treatment of spatial models of econometrics. Bramoull¶ e et al. (2009),
as we discuss above, and Lee (2007) and Lee et al. (2008) emphasize that identi¯cation of
peer e®ects in social interactions models may in fact be facilitated by network structure.
Lee et al. (2008) and Lin (2008) study the econometric properties and estimate a more
general version of the social interactions problem with a network structure, which is speci¯ed
in terms of groups g = 1;:::;G:
Yg = ¯JgYg + ®X + µJgZ + ®0g¶g + "g; (27)
where Yg is the column ng¡vector of outcomes for each member of group g and ng the group's
size, Jg the group g speci¯ed adjacency matrix, ¶g a column ng¡vector of ones, and "g; column
ng¡vector of shocks, and ®0g is a group speci¯c ¯xed e®ect. The adjacency matrices are
row-normalized. This is a generalization of the typical SAR model. The shocks "g's may
have a general variance-covariance matrix. However, the spatial econometrics literature has
typically assumed that
"g = ½¹ Jg"g + ²g; (28)
39where ¹ Jg is the group g speci¯ed error adjacency matrix, which may or may not be the
same as Jg; ²g and denotes a ng¡column of i.i.d. shocks. This may be thought of as a
generalization of variance based approaches with a more general interactions pattern.
A comparison of (24) and (27){(28) indicates how network and spatial models are inter-
related. Each assumes prior knowledge of the members of each agents group. Each assumes
that interactions within a group are homogeneous, i.e. the same weight is assigned to each
member of the group. The key di®erences lie in the introduction of an error structure cor-
responding to the network structure in the spatial econometrics case.
5.2 Empirics of Social Interactions in Social Networks
As we have emphasized, network models requires prior knowledge of the network structure.
Relatively few data sets have this feature.19 For this reason, economists have been especially
interested in the Add Health data set. Add Health20 is a US-based study that is designed
to facilitate exploration of the causes of health-related behaviors of adolescents in grades
7 through 12, the structure of adolescent friendship networks, and individual outcomes in
young adulthood. Add Health seeks to examine how social contexts (families, friends, peers,
schools, neighborhoods, and communities) in°uence adolescents' health and risk-taking be-
haviors. It has become a major resource for social network analysis. In the remainder of this
section we describe some of the most valuable studies using this data set.
19Interesting exceptions may be found in the development literature, e.g. Conley and Udry (2009), who
are able to study di®usion of technology across farmers, and the medical literature, in which Christakis and
Fowler (2007,2008a, 2008b) use a remarkable data set, the Framingham Heart Study, which was originally
constructed to study cardiac disease, to argue that obesity, smoking and happiness are all socially determined.
Other studies involve the creative use of more standard data sets. One example is Head and Meyer (2008),
who employ French birth data to study spatial patterns in names and identify social in°uences on name
choices. Of course, remarkable data do not by themselves reveal social interactions; Cohen-Cole and Fletcher
(2008a,b) strongly critique the Christakis and Fowler claims, based on the self-selection and unobserved group
e®ects problems we have mentioned: Christakis and Fowler (2008c) is a response.
20The National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Add Health)
http://www.cpc.unc.edu/addhealth.
40Fryer and Torelli (2006) use academic achievement as a de¯nition of \acting white"
by nonwhite students to examine its relationship to popularity. They measure popularity
in terms of a network-speci¯c spectral popularity measure, which identi¯es popularity of
the members of a group with the intensity of the social connections among the members
of that group. It is derived from the eigenvector associated with the maximal positive
eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix of each social group. Their data allows construction
of the full adjacency matrix for school-based social groups. Speci¯cally, this study can
be seen as a simpli¯ed version of (24), where instead of the full system of simultaneous
equations, achievement as an outcome is related to popularity, a statistic based on J in
equation (24). They demonstrate that there are large racial di®erences in the relationship
between popularity and academic achievement.
Weinberg (2007) reports on patterns on a broader set of behaviors. He ¯nds that behav-
ior for one's associates are above the mean for own behaviors, and so are their grades and
the educational accomplishments of their parents. A large part of the variation in friends'
grades, television watching, and family background arises within school grades. Regressing
individuals' characteristics against their own other characteristics and those of their friends
produces strong positive associations, which may be due to residential sorting. In examining
how endogenous association a®ects behavior, Weinberg predicts that hump-shaped di®er-
ence in associations and behaviors between people with high and low predicted behaviors
with respect to the share of the group with high predicted level of behavior is evidence of
assortative matching. The empirical results con¯rm the hump shape. That is as the share
of a social group with high (predicted) behavior increases, the mean behavior among their
friends who have a high (predicted) behavior increases relative to others initially, and then
declines as most of the macro-group has a high (predicted) level of that behavior.
Calv¶ o-Armengol, Patacchini and Zenou (2009) estimate individual school performance
as a function of the topology of their friendship networks, while controlling for individual
characteristics, such as family background controls, residential group variables, contextual
e®ects and school ¯xed e®ects. Speci¯cally, they assume that the part of observed individual
educational outcomes that are not explained for by individual characteristics are made up
41of network-component ¯xed e®ects, denoted by the vector ´g; and spatially autocorrelated
errors, ": This may be expressed in terms of the system (27){(28), where Y are educational
attainments, with the following modi¯cations: ¯ = 0; and the error structure in (28) allows
for component-speci¯c ¯xed e®ects:
" = aJg¶ + ÁJg" + ²: (29)
Since the error structure represents individual outcomes that are not explained for by indi-
vidual characteristics, X; and contextual e®ects, JX; it re°ects correlated e®ects and peer
e®ects. So, their estimation of the stochastic structure of of (27) with (29) subsumes en-
dogenous social e®ects into the estimation of (a;Á) above. Their results suggest that a
one-standard deviation increase in their proxy for the Bonacich centrality index [Bonacich
(1987)]21 translates into roughly 7 percent of a standard deviation in education outcomes.
Interestingly, these authors' estimates of (a;Á); the e®ect on a school performance index of
the number of each individual's friends and of the peer e®ect that is subsumed in the error
structure change little if social interactions are allowed to be directional [ ibid., Table 3 ].
Testing alternative measures of network connectedness, that is centrality as measured by each
individual's network degree, closeness, and betweenness shows that only degree centrality is
signi¯cant.
Lee, Liu and Lin (2008) report results using the Lee et al. techniques. This application
involves 74,300 observations belonging to 488 groups, de¯ned as school-grades. The average
group size is 119. Friendship networks within each school-grade group are modeled as com-
ponents of the social network. These authors obtain signi¯cant positive estimates of ¯ in
equation (27), using study e®ort as an outcome, and negative ones for ½; both for undirected
and directed networks. Lin (2008) explores a variety of alternative network speci¯cations,
allows for spatial autocorrelation in the residuals, obtaining signi¯cant negative estimates of
½ in (27) and con¯rms that presence of spatial autocorrelation in the residuals makes a big
21This concept teases out of the spectral properties of the normalized adjacency matrix the social impor-
tance of each individual, measured in terms of their social connectedness. The centrality of each individual in
the social structure re°ects the weighted sum of paths along the interaction structure of all di®erent possible
lengths.
42di®erence in that it raises the estimates of the endogenous social e®ect.
6 Conclusions
Scholarly interest in social interactions has rapidly expanded in many areas of economics
and led to numerous methodological and empirical advances. For theorists, key challenges
include the development of analytically tractable frameworks that allow for the analysis for
social interactions contexts in ways which accommodate increasingly rich forms of intertem-
poral as well as cross-section heterogeneity; in parallel to this theoretical work needs to ¯nd a
more constructive role for simulations when analytical tractability is impossible.22 For econo-
metricians, key challenges include social interactions e®ects on market outcomes coexisting
with feedbacks from the characteristics of individual market participants via their impacts
on prices, consequences of self-selection and the attendant role of presence of individual and
group unobservables. In the light of ever improving data availability, social interactions em-
pirics will rely increasingly critically on careful theorizing that involves precise de¯nitions
of social interactions, possibly by calling on psychology and sociology to de¯ne appropriate
social boundaries, and their scope, and must facilitate use of data from di®erent sources.
The likely payo® is enormous: better understanding of social forces in the modern economy,
with individuals' sharing information while self-selecting into social groups and living and
working in close proximity to one another as in ¯rms and cities encapsulate much of what
constitutes modern economic life..
22So called agent-based models do involve the simulation of interaction populations of agents, but this
work, in our view, has yet to embody interesting microeconomic foundations of the type found in the social
interactions literature.
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